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In the first section of this paper, it will be explained that though generalizations are 
misleading,  some  of  the  central  banks,  especially  among  the  advanced  and 
systemically  important  economies,  may  have  to  take  some,  though  not  entire 
responsibility, for causing the global financial crisis.  The second section elaborates 
that central banks  have  acquitted themselves well  in avoiding a financial collapse 
through support of respective governments, and coordination at global level enabled 
them to do so.  The fiscal authorities were leading the coordinated actions towards 
managing the crisis and embanking on the stimulus on multiple fronts.  It is likely that 
the  transparency  and  accountability  processes  are  also  unconventional.   The third 
section postulates that in regard to exit policies, central banks face pressures in terms 
of coordination among them and with fiscal authorities as well as other regulators 
within each country.  The fourth section briefly mentions select issues arising out of 
reforms under contemplation in financial sector, as a consequence of the crisis.  The 
fifth section lists the need to revisit governance issues in central banks in the light of 
experience  with  the  crisis.  The  concluding  part  focuses  on  governance  issues  of 























1.  Role of Central Banks in Causing the Crisis  
 
Central Banks have been held responsible for causing the crisis on several 
accounts:  
 
a)  The  monetary  authorities,  particularly  in  Advanced  Economies,  permitted 
excess liquidity by adopting relatively loose monetary policy;  
b)  They focused excessively on inflation or price stability, and thus neglected 
credit booms and asset bubbles;  
c)  They did not assume responsibility for financial stability on the ground that 
financial  stability  was  not  part  of  their  mandate,  and  that  they  had 
responsibility  mainly for inflation  and, to  some  extent, for  employment or 
output objectives;  
d)  Some of them were aware of the risks that were building up in the financial 
system, but they felt that the markets should be allowed to correct themselves.  
In their view, they had no way of determining whether the markets had under-
priced risks and, in any case, they could not have a better perception of risks 
than the market mechanisms;  
e)  Many of them felt that they do not have necessary policy tools and instruments 
to take actions to correct asset bubbles;  
f)  Some of them were uncomfortable with the build-up of excessive risks, but 
took  the  view  that  because  of  financial  innovations,  the  risks  were  highly 
dispersed and hence there was no serious threat to the financial system; 
g)  Many  of  them  felt  that  even  if  there  was  excessive  risk-taking  because 
investors were searching for yield, the banks were very well regulated and 
hence  banking  system  was  safe.    The  non-banks,  particularly  non-deposit 
taking institutions were, in their judgment, expected to assume the risks if they 
were to materialise, and they were capable of assuming such risks;  
h)  Most of them  expected the large financial institutions to have sophisticated 
risk assessment models, and many of the central banks and regulators assumed 
that self-regulation by such individual institutions was adequate to ensure the 
stability of the system;   
i)  More generally, the central banks had neglected issues like sudden drying up 
of liquidity in the system and prolonged pro-cyclical biases in the functioning 
of  markets.    They assumed  that  if  individual  institutions were solvent, the 
system would be risk-free.   
 
Several reasons are attributed for the failure of central banks in anticipating 
the crisis or preventing the crisis.  These include to a belief in ideology of unfettered 
markets; dependence on unrealistic models; capture of the monetary authorities and 
regulators  by  political  economy  considerations  and  the  regulatory  institutions;  a 
failure  in  governance  in  the  central  banks,  and  possibly  in  several  institutions 
including central bank and finally a combination of these.   
 
2.  Generalizations are Misleading  
 
The  above  presentation  should  be  treated  as  broad  generalizations,  but  it 
should be subjected to several caveats.  Firstly, the crisis in financial sector did not 
happen in all countries, and particularly most of the developing economies , were 2 
 
spared of serious financial crisis.  In fact, many of the advanced economies such as 
Canada, had their financial sector, by and large, resilient.   
 
Secondly,  the  failure  of  government  was  not  confined  to  central  banks  or 
regulators  because  the  regulated  institutions  had  several  layers  of  governance 
prescribed,  such  as  Board  of  Directors,  Audit  committees,  Risk  Management 
Institutions, etc.  Similarly, the accounting and auditing bodies, credit rating agencies 
and self-regulatory organizations have all contributed to the enormous leverage and 
risk taking.   
 
Thirdly, among those countries which were seriously affected, the regulatory 
structures had differed.  In other words, there was no particular regulatory structure or 
governance arrangement that could be identified as common to all the countries where 
the financial crisis occurred.  The crisis had happened in a country like the USA with 
multiple regulators and U.K. with a single regulator.  A study of those countries which 
were  not  affected  by  serious  financial  crisis  also  shows  diversity  in  regulatory 
structures, and consequential governance arrangements.   
 
Fourthly, the most affected countries are, however, found to be those where 
the growth of financial sector was significantly ahead of the growth of ‘real’ sector.   
 
Fifthly, countries where the retail banking dominated the financial sector and 
where less sophisticated financial instruments were used, were less affected compared 
to those economies in which large scale financial innovations dominated.   
 
Sixthly,  in  many  of the developing  economies,  the  financial  crisis  did not 
occur  domestically,  but  severe  problems  arose  as  a  result  of  the  contagion  from 
advanced  economies.    The  extent,  to  which  the  financial  sector  of  developing 
economies  was  affected,  depended  on  the  extent  of  integration  of  their  financial 
markets with markets of advanced economies.  Further, those countries which had 
heavy dependence on commodity exports were also affected through the secondary 
impact of financial crisis in advanced economies on real economic activity, resulting 
in recession or fear of recession.   
 
Seventhly,  those  developing  economies  which  had  maintained  significant 
forex  reserves,  and those  which  did  not have high  current  account deficits, faced 
lesser intensity of the contagion from advanced economies to their financial markets 
and financial institutions.   
 
In brief, the structures relating to monetary and regulatory authorities seem to 
have played a lesser role than the policies adopted, especially those which related to 
growth and regulation of financial sector, and to some extent monetary policies.  The 
policies adopted could be explained in terms of either ideological commitments or 
political  economy  considerations,  both  at  national  and  global  level.    In  a  way, 
therefore, the lessons that central banks have to learn have to be more in terms of 
governance very broadly defined, rather than institutional structures and their inter-





3.  Role Of Central Banks in Managing the Crisis 
 
There is a general consensus that in times of financial crisis, the central banks 
are at the forefront in managing the crisis and are often described as the first line of 
defense.    In  a  narrow  sense,  they  are  lenders  of  the  last  resort  to  vulnerable 
institutions,  and  in  a  broader  sense,  they  are  finally  in  charge  of  liquidity  in  the 
system, as a whole.  In brief, to the extent central banks are critical to liquidity in the 
system as well as in individual institutions, they would have to be the first line of 
defense in times of stress.  The central banks of select relevant advanced economies 
responded promptly to the onset of the crisis, and there was significant coordination 
among them.  Initially, as soon as crisis erupted, coordinated monetary actions were 
taken by systemically important countries.  However, in view of the nature, spread 
and  intensity  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  lines  between  solvency  and  liquidity  of 
individual institutions, as also the requirement of liquidity in the financial markets, 
became blurred and uncertain.  There was virtual collapse of the normal functioning 
of the markets in the sense that there were no transactions to guide either the market 
or the authorities on the right price (since process of price discovery collapsed in the 
light of absence of transactions), and this occurred almost across the board in many 
systemically important financial markets.   
 
The central banks, which were in the forefront of managing the crisis, had to 
take  a  call  in  determining  whether  they  were  taking  serious  risks  of  supporting 
insolvent  institutions,  or  non  marketable  market  instruments.    The  large  scale 
operations  involving  provision  of  liquidity  to  markets  and  institutions  required 
significant assumption of risky assets on the balance sheets of the central banks with   
attendant quasi-fiscal implications.  Hence, while the central banks were first line of 
defense, as soon as it became clear that it is a large scale financial crisis requiring 
massive  liquidity injections through open market operations, central banks had no 
choice except to obtain assurances of firm support from the fiscal authorities about 
their operations with huge potential for quasi-fiscal implications.  Moreover, there are 
many financial institutions whose solvency was questioned by the financial markets 
themselves.  Hence, it was not possible to ensure their normal functioning without 
prompt injection of capital.  Since financial markets were almost collapsing, many of 
the  affected institutions were  not in a position to raise capital.  It was, therefore, 
necessary to undertake either nationalization as in U.K. or bail-out operations as in 
USA, and both these operations possibly proposed by the central banks, required firm 
fiscal actions or backing.   
 
The  moment  the  magnitude  of  the  crisis  was  recognized  as  large,  a  close 
involvement of fiscal authorities particularly in regard to judgment on the range and 
magnitudes  of  actions  mentioned  above  became  inevitable.    More  generally,  the 
magnitudes of financial crisis were such that it quickly transformed into an economic 
crisis.    Fiscal  stimulus  thus  became  inevitable,  and  thus  very  close  coordination 
between  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities  also  became  inevitable.    The  extent  and 
nature of coordination between central banks and governments in countries depended 
on the requirements of liquidity and solvency in financial sector and dampening of 
economic activity. 
 
Soon after the onset of the financial crisis, it was realised that coordination 
between systemically  important countries comprising of both advanced economies 4 
 
and developing economies was essential.  It was also realised that the crisis required 
action not only on the part of finance ministers and governors of central banks, but on 
a broader scale.  Hence, the heads of states had to take the initiative for international 
coordination  through  the  convening  of  meeting  of  heads  of  governments  of  G20 
countries.  In these arrangements, it becomes necessary for central banks to reconcile 
the national interests with global obligations.  It is not necessary that the national and 
global  demands  for  action  always  converge,  though  at  the  time  of  the  crisis 
management, there has been considerable convergence  in terms of direction.  The 
compulsions of coordination at global level on broader economic issues necessarily 
involve initiatives at the level of sovereign.  These considerations further reinforce the 
need for central banks to align their policies with that of governments.   
 
The governance arrangements in most of the central banks are predicated on 
the assumption of operational autonomy to the central banks in terms of discharge of 
their  functions  while  simultaneously  insisting  on  transparency  and  accountability.  
These governance arrangements are meant for normal circumstances and designed 
essentially  to  respond  to  domestic  issues.    It  is  quite  possible  that  extra-ordinary 
measures  required  to  meet  a  crisis  would  normally  involve  an  understanding  of 
unconventional accountability procedures.  The balance sheet of a central bank  in 
dealing with the crisis generally expands significantly, and given the nature of the 
problems will be inherently  less transparent.  Further, it is  virtually impossible to 
assess the value of assets and liabilities on a mark to market basis when the markets 
have collapsed.  At the best, there can be only what may be termed as retrospective 
transparency  and  expected  accountability.    At  the  same  time,  there  are  serious 
reputational  risks  for  central  banks  in  regard  to  these  operations.    These  may  be 
revealed as time passes and not necessarily when the crisis is at its worst.      
 
It is necessary to note that most of these issues are essentially applicable to 
select advanced economies.  In most others, including developing economies, there 
have been pressures on the financial markets, and in response, some unconventional 
measures were undertaken, but these related essentially to liquidity with insignificant 
implications for solvency.  Where financial markets were affected and external sector 
was under serious pressure with a consequent serious impact on real economy, the 
actions by central banks were considerably influenced by the programmes under IMF 
and World Bank, especially for developing economies.  Hence, for most developing 
economies, the governance arrangements in central banks in the context of the crisis 
may not be a contentious issue in terms of managing the crisis.   
 
There  is  a  general  consensus  that,  by  and  large,  the  central  banks  have 
succeeded in avoiding a collapse of the financial markets.  However, in doing so, 
central banks in systemically important  advanced economies  had undertaken extra-
ordinary measures involving significant fiscal costs.  In brief, the debates in regard to 
the  governance  arrangements  in  central  banks  may  be  predominantly  in  select 
advanced economies.   
 
4.  Role of Central Banks in Exit Policies  
 
Central banks  have acted in response to the crisis on an  emergency basis, 
addressing both liquidity and solvency issues.  In terms of general direction, the crisis 
was common to all economies and hence both central banks and fiscal authorities in 5 
 
all countries moved in the  same direction.  The measures were unconventional in 
many cases.  They were coordinated because the crisis happened about the same time 
on  a  global  scale.    The  immediate  impact  of  the  crisis  and  the  stimulus  on  the 
individual national economies has been uneven across countries in terms of slowing 
down of growth and loss of confidence while financial markets resumed functioning 
globally  in  a  fairly  normal  manner.    Hence,  the  compulsions  to  exit  from  the 
unconventional measures and stimulus are also uneven among the countries.     
 
However,  two  sets  of  issues  are  to  be  addressed  by  central  banks  in  all 
countries.  First, exit policies are to be coordinated and sequenced between central 
banks and fiscal authorities.  While the central banks consider medium to long term 
horizons  in  the  post-crisis  period,  the  fiscal  authorities,  and  possibly  financial 
markets,  may  lay  greater  emphasis  on  avoiding  shorter  term  risks.    Secondly, 
coordination is required between central banks of different countries, which becomes  
extremely complex when the response of economies to the stimulus varies.  The initial 
conditions  of  different  countries  were  vastly  different,  and  correspondingly  the 
policies towards stimulus and the response of the financial markets and economies 
had necessarily to be different.  While inherent preference to delay initiation of exit or 
prolong the process of exit by fiscal authorities may be common between advanced 
economies and  developing  economies, the  objective  conditions  in  many  advanced 
economies warrant priority to avoiding deflation or double depression while for many 
developing economies fighting inflation is the over-riding priority.   
 
In  view of  divergence  in  economic cycles  among  countries,  divergence  in 
policies particularly monetary policies become inevitable.  The monetary authorities 
particularly of systemically important countries (issuing reserve currencies) have a 
challenge before them, viz., to take risks that appear reasonable to stimulate their 
domestic economy, but at the same time, they cannot ignore the risks that may arise to 
the rest of the global economy due to their actions.  It is in this context that the 
quantitative issuing in United States has become a subject matter of both domestic and 
global debate.   
 
The  exit  policies  are  understandably  more  contentious  than  coordinated 
stimulus to avoid collapse of markets and depression in economy.  The experience 
with  what  may  be  termed  as  successful  cooperation  in  avoiding  collapse  and 
complexities in executing exit from stimulus should provide important lessons for the 
future  governance  arrangements  for  central  banks.    In  brief,  the  experience  with 
management of crisis and exit will have significant influence on several aspects of 
functioning of central banks in future.   
 
5.  Reforms Underway and their Broader Relevance 
 
It is worth noting that reforms relating to the institutional arrangements that 
affect central banks have so far been undertaken mainly in U.S.A., U.K. and Euro 
areas where the financial crisis originated.  Secondly, the guidelines in regard to the 
regulation of the financial sector have been designed under the aegis of the Bank for 
International Settlement in order to avoid threats to financial stability in future.   
 
The three important issues that arise in this regard for discussion and debate 
are:   6 
 
 
1)  Should there be a review of the governance arrangements in central banks in 
developing economies also, though the crisis by itself had no link with their 
institutional arrangements? 
2)  Whether the financial sector regulations which are being designed in response 
to the crisis in select countries should be equally applicable to the developing 
economies  also,  despite    the  fact  that  there  were  no  serious  regulatory 
shortcomings  in  most  of  them.    There  may  be  problems  that  need  to  be 
addressed  among  developing  economies,  but  how  are  they  related  to  the 
causes and management of the crisis?  Should there be attention to issues of 
contagion which was the main cause of crisis in developing economies? 
3)  Should the changes in the regulatory regimes that emphasis the importance of 
financial stability be equally applicable to developing economies?   
 
Alternatively, it can be argued that broader lessons from the crisis should be 
taken by the developing economies in devising their own systems.  These lessons are 
two fold: (a) admittedly, regulatory framework must be an instrument for stability, 
and equally therefore, it can be an instrument for promoting development; and   (b) 
institutional structures and policies for central banks that were once considered to be 
ideal, towards which the developing economies were working, proved to be less than 
adequate.    Hence,  some  of  the  changes  that  were  considered  appropriate  by 
developing economies as part of financial sector reform or development in the pre-
crisis period may not be warranted now.  In brief, slow change in several areas in 
regard to the institutions and practices of central banking in developing economies or 
changes  only  in  select  areas  where  short-comings  are  experienced  in  developing 
economies  concerned,  may  also  be  one  of  the  appropriate  lessons  for  developing 
economies.   
 
 
6.  Governance Issues: Need to Revisit  
 
 
It is generally recognized that effective governance arrangements for central 
banks can be quite complex, involving several trade-offs and compromises, and they 
differ from country to country.  However, it is possible to identify some common 
features  in  general  terms.    Broadly  speaking,  the  common  features  relating  to 
governance  arrangements  for  central  banks  could  be  analysed  in  terms  of  the 
objectives  or the mandate,  the  political  framework  and legal studies,  the  decision 
making  structures,  relations  with  government  and  financial  resources.    It  is  also 
recognized that these arrangements evolve over a period of time, depending on the 
evolving  economic  challenges,  and  social-political  developments.    The  global 
financial crisis in terms of magnitudes, intensity and complexity and its management, 
are likely to evoke a revisit on several aspects of the governance arrangements in 
many, if not all, countries.   
 
Firstly,  it  is  clear  that the  mandate  of  a  central bank  is  extending  beyond 
inflation  targets  and  output  or  employment.    The  mandate  will  certainly  include, 
explicitly  or  implicitly,  financial  stability,  and  in  some  cases,  development  of 
financial  markets.    An  extended  mandate  involves  complex  trade  offs  between 7 
 
competing considerations.  Further, an enlarged mandate often requires considerable 
element of judgment relative to rules. 
 
Secondly, coordination issues will have to come to the fore in view of the 
change in the policy framework for management of financial sector which recognizes 
the  need  for  intervention  in  the  market  mechanisms  in  a  countercyclical  manner.  
Such intervention may have to be coordinated between fiscal, monetary and financial 
regulatory authorities.  In any such arrangement of coordination, the central bank as 
custodian of liquidity and a lender of last resort will have to play critical part though, 
in many cases, it could play a leading part in non-crisis circumstances.     
 
Thirdly, the issue of accountability for the suffering that has been caused by 
the crisis is being raised.  It was not focused in public debates as long as the emphasis 
was on preventing a financial collapse, but a detailed examination of the crisis and the 
consequences would inevitably point to the issue of accountability.  As the future 
burdens  get  crystalised,  the  issue  of  accountability  would  come  to  the  fore, 
particularly in countries where there have been heavy interventions by central banks 
due to the crisis in financial sector.  Consequently, the strengthening of accountability 
arrangements in central banks should be anticipated, whether through law or by other 
means.   
 
Fourthly, as part of the issue of accountability, the responsibility for decision 
making would also be considered, that is, whether it should be individual oriented or 
committee oriented.  If it were committee oriented, whether the individuals will be 
held responsible for the position taken.  Moreover, the composition of the committee 
itself could be a matter of discussion.  In other words, it may be argued that the 
conduct of business in central banks should be governed by a Board which is not 
dominated by economists and financial experts, though they should find a prominent 
place.  Representation for other stake holders in the decision making process in the 
central bank may be advocated.  Possibility of a two tier boards, with a supervisory 
and executive levels should not be ruled out for central banks.   
 
Fifthly, fiscalisation of central banking is, to some extent, inevitable.  The 
quasi  fiscal  implications  of  crisis  management  are  apparent.    Once  serious 
consideration  is  given  to  taxation  of  financial  sector  and  bank  tax,  the  overlap 
between the regulation of financial sector and the fiscal regime becomes apparent.   
 
Sixthly,  mounting  public  debt,  particularly  in  advanced  economies  would 
require an active management of public debt.  It is inevitable that management of 
large public debt would be facilitated by a broader public policy view on the level of 
inflation, the regulatory prescriptions on holding of government debt, etc. which often 
overlap with monetary policies. 
 
Seventhly, the mandate for central banks is essentially to serve the interests of 
domestic  economy.    However,  increasingly  coordination  of  monetary  policies 
including management of capital account and regulation of financial sector, do point 
to the need for considering externally imposed obligations or constraints on national 
policies.  At one level, this raises the issue of the importance of clarity in the mandate, 
and  at  the  other  level,  the  issues  of  conflict  between  the  domestic  and  global 
compulsions that would have to be addressed particularly by systemically important 8 
 
countries.  There are proposals for imposition of sanctions on those countries which 
do not carry out their global obligations in financial sector.  The responses to these 
suggestions would require a view beyond national sovereignty vis-à-vis the global 
pressures and such a view cannot be taken by central bank without active involvement 
of the government.   
 
Eighthly, there is often a discussion as to whether governance arrangements 
for  meeting  emergencies  should  be  specifically  designed  since  the  normal 
arrangements  do  not  suffice  to  meet  emergencies.    In  view  of  difficulties  in 
anticipating the crisis, and more important, the  nature of the crisis as  well as the 
possible  policy  responses,  it  may  be  difficult  to  have  tailor-made  governance 
arrangements for meeting the crisis.  It is clear that during times of serious crisis, the 
government  would  virtually  takeover  the  function  of  coordination  among  the 
regulators and monetary authorities.  In the normal times, the central bank will have to 
play a central role in managing stability issues due to its expertise and being lender of 
last resort.  In other words, as experience with recent crisis has demonstrated, the 
sovereign will assume the central role when conditions of instability turn into crisis-
situations.   
 
Ninthly, there is a view that arrangements for public governance over central 
banks (as distinct from the well known standards of corporate governance) should be 
strengthened in view of the experience gained.  This approach would mean emphasis 
on personal integrity, security of employment or long term careers, and maintaining 
basic values and elements of public sector culture.  There are some who argue that 
this would be at the cost of efficiency.   
 
Finally, there are proposals from academics, to have a new institution working 
as  a  “public  sentry”,  independent  of  both  political  and  market  influences,  and 
comprising of eminent persons commanding high respect.  Such an institution would 
continuously assess and comment on policies in financial sector, delivering a formal 
report to both legislative and executives branches, and thus to public at large.   
 
7.  Emerging Governance Issues for Developing Economies  
 
Firstly, there appears to be greater legitimacy for a broader mandate which is 
often  prevalent  in  many  developing  economies.    In  many  of  them,  banking 
supervision is part of central bank’s mandate.  Even among those countries where 
banking supervision is separated, particularly in Asia, there is a close relationship 
between the two with defacto dominance of monetary authority.  In some countries, 
central banks are closely involved in public debt management, though there have been 
recommendations for a separate debt office.  Recent experience in Euro area and the 
possible developments in regard to public debt management may enhance the case for 
close coordination between management of public debt and central banks.   
 
Secondly, in terms of micro structures, including technology, payment  and 
clearing systems, and even rating agencies, the importance of public policy has been 
realised.    Development  of  such  infrastructure  along  with  regulation  would  be  a 
priority in developing economies.   
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Thirdly,  there  are  several  issues  in  regard  to  the  functioning  of  financial 
markets, and a careful balance has to be struck between development of financial 
markets, regulation of financial markets and avoidance of excessive financialisation.  
Further, there is a greater need for understanding the links between the real sector and 
the  financial  sector,  especially  in  economies  undergoing  rapid  structural 
transformation.  The development and regulation of financial sector that is expected to 
facilitate economic growth while maintaining stability could pose greater challenges 
to the policies of managing financial sector, particularly in terms of coordination.    
 
Fourthly, intervention in the financial markets by central banks may be less of 
an exception and more of a rule, in future.  Such interventions especially in the forex 
markets  would  require  sound    mechanisms  for  risk  mitigation  as  well  as 
accountability.   
 
Fifthly, attracting and retention of skills in the central banks of developing 
economies has become a serious problem.  Achieving a balance between high salaries 
of the private sector globally and relatively higher security in the public sector while 
retaining the incentives for performance within the central bank is a complex task.   
 
Finally,  the  importance  of  precautionary  steps  in  the  management  of  the 
economy to avoid serious instability may have to be given priority.  For example, it 
may be argued that monetary actions to facilitate successful conduct of government 
debt may distort the markets and involve moral hazards in terms of  incentives to 
pursue prudent macro policies.  On the other hand, taking precautionary steps, as it 
was done in the case of India, would protect the economies from threat of instability.   
 
In brief, in developing economies, the central banks may have to become more 
central  than  they  have  been  before,  with  an  enlarged  mandate  and  perhaps  more 
accountable  than  they  have  been  before.    Many  of  their  actions,  including 
differentiating  between  structural  and  cyclical  factors  for  their  actions  and  other 
associated fiscal and regulatory policies, may warrant greater recourse to judgment 
than  rules.    The  governance  arrangements  that  served  some  of  the  developing 
economies well should be the role models for the future.  
 